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Numerous studies have identified both value and size effects existing in international markets. Fewer studies have been 
conducted that document the same effects in the South African market. In this study, portfolios were constructed based on 
four valuation multiples, as well as market capitalisation from 1999 2012. In this 14-year period it was found that value 
stocks predominantly outperformed growth stocks when defined by P/E or P/CF. Growth stocks outperformed value 
stocks when the portfolios were based on P/B and DY. Also, significant evidence of a small firm premium was identified 
on the JSE, regardless of the valuation multiple. Furthermore, small-cap value stocks generated the highest mean returns 
over the period. The study identifies the prevalence of these premiums on the JSE, but the comprehensive explanations 
for these anomalies remain inconclusive. 
Introduction 
Historically, academics and investors have focused their 
research on understanding and evaluating growth and value 
firms, generally with large market capitalisations (Dimson, 
Nagel & Quigley, 2003). As a result, the variety of investor 
valuations and opinions - often guided by academic 
research for exploiting market anomalies unique to these 
companies - is extensive. 
At a simplistic level, individuals and institutions tend to 
invest in value and growth stocks (Chan & Lakonishok, 
2004 ). Typically, value stocks are understood as being 
"cheap" or facing financial difficulty - defined as having 
low price multiples (Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; 
Fama & French, 1998). Investors tend to buy these stocks in 
anticipation of a business turnaround and to capitalise on 
them being undervalued. The converse is true for growth 
stocks, which al'e stereotypically expensive - exhibiting 
high price multiples. The reason for buying growth stocks is 
to profit from their high growth potential. For investment 
security, risk aversion and lower transaction costs, investors 
prefer purchasing the stock of large companies displaying 
either of the aforementioned traits. Naturally, this all points 
to the widely documented analysis of whether value stocks 
outperform growth stocks, and to the existence of a value 
effect (Lakonishok eta/., 1994). 
Large, mature companies are known as large-cap 
companies. Conversely, smaller and less mature companies 
are donned small-caps. The "cap" refers to the market 
capitalisation of the business, which is defined as the 
product of the number of outstanding shares and the 
company's share price. However, less investor focus has 
been placed on the smaller (and often less mature) 
companies. This phenomenon may be attributed to the 
higher risk profile associated with small firms (Roll, 1981). 
The resulting neglect leads to fewer reliable valuations, 
stock illiquidity, and limited stock information being 
available for such companies (Arbel & Strebel, 1982; 
Damodaran, 2012: 335-7). This lack of information, 
illiquidity of stock and lack of investor interest may lead to 
anomalies in the market, which investors can exploit -
namely through the size effect, initially documented by 
Banz (1980). 
From the many studies conducted internationally as well as 
those conducted domestically, in South African markets, a 
number of investment strategies have emerged that exploit 
investment in either value or small-cap stocks. For example, 
Basu (1977), Banz (1980), Roll (1980), Lakonishok et a/. 
(1994), Fama and French (1998), and Bauman, Conover and 
Miller (1998) have confirmed these two anomalies 
internationally, while Graham and Uliana (200 1 ), Van 
Rensburg and Robertson (2003), Strugnell, Gilbert and 
Kruger (20 11 ), Auret and Cline (20 11 ), and Hodnett, Hsieh 
and Van Rensburg (2012) have studied them domestically. 
The theories that are tested in this study pertain to the 
widely researched value premium, as well as the small firm 
premium that may exist on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE). 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: the next 
section reviews prior domestic and international research 
surrounding the value effect, size effect, and mean 
reversion. After which is a description of the raw data 
obtained and the research methodology that was applied, 
followed by the results that were obtained by conducting t-
tests on the average annual portfolio returns. These results 
suggest that not only do the size and value premiums exist 
on the JSE, but so does a growth premium. The final section 
concludes the article by drawing on the results derived, as 
well as suggesting a direction for future work. 
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Literature review 
To explore the existence of both a value and size premium 
on the JSE, it is important to understand and analyse 
previous empirical and theoretical studies pertaining to both 
international and domestic markets. Firstly, the value 
premium is examined, followed by the size premium and 
lastly, literature concerning mean reversion is discussed. 
The value premium 
Extraordinary investors, namely Warren Buffett and Philip 
Fisher, have been successful in buying and selling both 
value and growth stocks, respectively. However, the dispute 
rages on as to which type of stock yields the highest return 
while offering the lowest risk. 
Value stocks are conventionally defined as stocks that 
exhibit low price to book (P/B) ratios; low price earnings 
(P/E) ratios; high dividend yields (DY) (Basu, 1977; Fama 
& French, 1992; Damodaran, 2012: 259); low price to cash 
flow (P/CF) (Lakonishok et al., 1994); and historically low 
earnings per share (EPS) relative to the market. Value 
investors buy stocks that are cheaper than their underlying 
fundamentals indicate. 
By contrast, growth stocks are defined as having multiples 
with the opposite characteristics to value stocks: high price 
to book, high price earnings, low dividend yield, high price 
to cash flow, and high past growth rates in EPS relative to 
the market (Bauman et al., 1998). Growth investors buy 
shares that have high growth potential for a low price. 
By 1998, a number of studies of the US stock market had 
shown that value stocks outperformed growth stocks, but the 
reasons for this return differential is varied. Fama and 
French (1992) offered the explanation that value stocks were 
more risky than growth stocks, and as a result would 
compensate for this risk through higher returns. Opposing 
this, Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Chan and Lakonishok 
(2004) found that common risk measures did not justify the 
evidence of a value premium; hence value stocks were not 
more risky than growth stocks. Instead, they found that 
value stocks yielded higher returns due to investors 
overestimating expected returns on growth stocks relative to 
value stocks - simply put: this is an example of suboptimal 
investor behaviour. 
Bauman and Miller (1997, cited in Bauman et al., 1998) 
concurred with the previous finding. They noticed that the 
growth rate in EPS displayed qualities of mean reversion. 
Thus, the historically high growth rates in EPS associated 
with growth stocks would decline and the previously low 
growth rates in EPS exhibited by value stocks would 
increase. They concluded that analysts overestimated the 
growth in EPS of growth stocks relative to value stocks. 
Therefore, achieved returns on growth shares were lower 
than expected, because of analysts' high expectations. 
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Bauman et al. (1998) conducted research on the existence of 
a value premium existing outside the US, in international 
markets. The results of their study suggested that value 
stocks were as dominant in international markets as they 
were in the US market. Fama and French (1998) arrived at 
similar conclusions about international markets, and also 
found that these traits were exhibited in developing markets. 
The value premium was also found to occur on the London 
Stock Exchange between 1955 and 2001, as identified by 
Dimson et al. (2003). Blount (2010) validates this further in 
an article stating that growth stocks do not grow. He wrote 
about a study of 10 000 global stocks over 35 years that 
proved that value stocks outperformed both growth stocks 
and the market, while growth stocks underperformed the 
market. 
Graham and Uliana (2001) conducted a study on the value 
effect on the JSE from 1987- 1996. They found that growth 
outperformed value shares pre-1992, and that value 
outperformed growth post-1992 suggesting that the 
turnaround might have been the result of political and 
economic factors. Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003), 
Strugnell et al. (20 11 ), and Hodnett et al. (20 12) all noted 
that a value effect existed on the JSE. However, Auret and 
Cline (20 11) found the opposite, i.e., that neither a value nor 
growth effect existed on the JSE. 
The small firm premium 
Apart from the difference in investment styles between 
growth and value investors, there is also the question of 
whether to invest in large- or small-cap stock. Investors also 
dispute whether small-cap stocks, on average, outperform 
large-cap stocks, thus exhibiting a small firm size premium, 
and whether this is associated with small firm risks (Roll, 
1981 ; Reinganum, 1982). 
Large-cap stocks are generally associated with large and 
reputable businesses (Eun, Huang & Lai, 2008) with large 
market capitalisations. The opposite is true for small-caps, 
which are stereotypically more risky investments, since they 
do not always grow to become mid- to large-caps. 
Previously, they may have even been large- or mid-caps that 
are now in distress (Chan & Chen, 1991). 
The risk is due to small businesses being small for a reason: 
either they have just started up and are growing; or they may 
be a marginal firm - defined as having lost value due to 
weak performance, high leverage, poor cash flows, and 
exhibit inefficiencies in production (Chan & Chen, 1991). 
Brink (20 1 0) stated that small-cap stocks are less frequent! y 
traded (or less liquid) than large-cap stocks. As a result, 
fewer investors research small-cap firms, resulting in less 
information in the market about them. He goes on to say that 
the onus is on the investor to select high-quality small-cap 
stocks in order to benefit from the small firm premium. 
Banz (1980) examined the relationship between market cap 
and return in the US market, and found that small-cap stocks 
earned higher risk-adjusted returns than large-cap stocks. 
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Fama and French (1992) and, later confirmed by Barber and 
Lyon (1997), found that small firms outperformed large 
firms in the periods they tested. Banz also noted that there 
was a less significant difference in returns between mid- to 
large-cap firms. Banz suspected that the size effect might be 
as a result of additional factors, rather than size alone. One 
factor was that a lack of information about small firms 
generated a demand for higher returns. 
Arbel and Strebel (1982) found that the amount of research 
done on a firm was strongly related to a return premium, 
rather than being solely associated with size. The less 
researched (or more neglected) the firm, the higher were the 
returns. The lack of information surrounding the stock 
created uncertainty for the investor, which resulted in a 
return premium being demanded. It was found that the 
neglected firms were generally small-caps rather than large-
caps. 
Roll (1981) explained that the small firm effect arose due to 
risk being incorrectly calculated for small firms. This 
underestimation of risk resulted in over-estimated risk-
adjusted returns for small firms, hence the subsequent 
superior returns. Reinganum (1982) tested Roll's theory and 
found that small firm risk was understated, but the 
underestimation did not completely account for the small 
size effect. Horowitz, Loughran and Savin (2000) conducted 
research on the US market between 1980 and 1996, the 
results of which refuted the existence of a size premium. Of 
the three methodologies used, none suggested the existence 
of a small firm premium. Their conclusion was that the size 
effect was strictly academic and was implausible in practice. 
Differences in risk between large and small firms have been 
found, but firm size itself is not the sole cause. Riskier firms 
tended to be marginal firms and marginal firms have higher 
expected rates of return than firms that are not. A large 
proportion of small-cap firms comprise marginal firms, 
which may account somewhat for the small firm premium 
(Chan & Chen, 1991). 
Bauman et al. (1998) conducted a study on growth versus 
value and large-cap versus small-cap in international 
markets. Their conclusions were that value stocks 
outperformed growth stocks except for the portfolio 
containing the smallest firms. Dhatt, Kim and Mukherji 
(1 999) conducted a similar study on the performance of 
small-cap value stocks in the US market. Their results 
showed that sm all-cap value stocks outperformed growth 
stocks and that most of this premium arose outside of 
January. This is contradictory to Keirn (1 982) who found 
that almost 50% of the size effect was due to small firms 
experiencing abnormal returns in January relative to large 
firms. 
In the South African context, Auret and Cline (2011) found 
that neither the January effect nor the small firm effect 
existed on the JSE in the periods that they studied. However, 
research conducted by Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003), 
Strugnell et al. (2011), and Hodnett et al. (201 2) contradict 
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Auret and Cline's results and found a size effect to reside on 
the JSE. 
Mean reversion: Winner versus loser portfolios 
As with trying to capitalise on value and size anomalies, 
investors and academics have tried to generate excess 
returns by utilising the mean reverting characteristic of 
markets, as well as trying to explain why stocks do revert to 
normal prices. 
Prior to Fama and French (1988) and Poterba and Summers 
(1988), studies had looked at autocorrelation over short time 
periods. However, F ama and French (1988) and Poterba and 
Summers (1988) opted to look at autocorrelations over 
longer time periods. They found that in periods longer than a 
year, there was significant negative autocorrelation, 
illustrating the mean reverting qualities of stock prices in 
both the US and international markets. Later research 
(Jagadeesh, 1991) identified mean reversion in the equally 
weighted index on both the New York and London Stock 
Exchanges, thus confirming the findings of Fama and 
French and Poterba and Summers. However, the mean 
reverting properties were found to occur mostly in January. 
Opposing this, Kim, Nelson and Startz (1991) found mean 
reversion to be strictly associated with pre-war stock prices 
and no evidence of mean reversion was found post-war. 
Their research was re-examined by McQueen (1992), who 
found that pre-war mean reversion was overstated due to the 
types of statistical tests conducted. He found that, by using a 
different analysis, mean reversion did not exist in the 
periods tested by Kim et al . (1 991). Similar results were 
found in an international study of 18 indexes, where most of 
the indexes did not show evidence of mean reversion 
(Cochran & DeFina, 1994) . The indexes that exhibited mean 
reversion were explained by country-specific factors. 
More recent r esearch (Balvers, Wu & Gilliland, 2000) found 
that there was much controversy surrounding m ean 
reversion, and explained that numerous studies had argued 
against Fama and French and Poterba and Summers' 
findings. Much of the controversy surrounded the 
availability of high-quality long-term time series, which 
were needed to detect mean reversion. However, in Balvers, 
Wu and Gilliland's research spanning 27 years of share data, 
they found evidence of mean reversion in stock prices, and 
that it took approximately 3,5 years for a stock to return 
halfway to its mean price. 
Some explanations of mean reversion are closely related to 
investor overreaction to stock information (De Bondt & 
Thaler, 1985; Muller, 1999). Therefore, if bad (good) news 
about a stock arises, investors overreact, and the share price 
will fall (rise) more than it should. Inevitably, the market 
corrects itself over t ime, and the share price rises (falls) to 
its supposed normal price (Page & Way, 1992). This leads 
to a strategy of buying "loser" stocks - stocks that have 
fallen the most over a period - and selling "winner" stocks -
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stocks that have increased the most over the past period -to 
take advantage of mean reversion (Damodaran, 2012: 285). 
In 1985, De Bondt and Thaler found that mean reversion 
existed for US stocks that had faced long-term gains or 
losses; therefore, previous losers performed better than 
previous winners. They noted that the loser portfolios 
outperformed the winner portfolios by approximately 25% -
30%, between three and five years after the portfolios were 
formed. In addition, the loser portfolios earned excess 
returns in January for up to five years. In a follow-up paper 
(De Bondt & Thaler, 1987) evidence was found that 
corroborated their earlier paper, despite compensating for 
firm size and risk differences. 
In terms of a short-term holding strategy - between three 
and twelve months - Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) suggest 
buying winners and selling losers. They found that the 
length of the holding period of a loser or winner portfolio 
could affect returns; this was due to short-term price 
momentum (six to twelve months) benefiting winner 
portfolios, and long-term price reversals (three to five years) 
aiding loser portfolios. Their results illustrated that the 
winners outperformed the losers in the first year, but after 
one year, the winners' outperformance began to dissipate. 
However, it was noted that it could take in excess of 36 
months for the loser portfolios to outperform the winners. 
Researchers such as Page and Way (1992), Muller (1999), 
Cubbin et al. (2006), and Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) have 
explored the less developed South African market for mean 
reversion and investor overreaction. Page and Way (1 992) 
analysed the JSE over the 1974 - 1989 period for 
overreactions and subsequent reversion. The results of their 
analysis indicated that using return information from 
previous periods might lead to predictable future returns. 
They also found that, on average, loser portfolios 
outperformed winners by approximately 20% within three 
years of portfolio construction - indicating the long-term 
nature of mean reversion, which is consistent with the 
aforementioned international studies. However, the January 
effect, mentioned previously, was not as pronounced on the 
JSE as it was in the US market. 
An analysis of the 1985 - 1998 period, found that loser 
portfolios on the JSE outperformed winner portfolios by 5% 
and the market by 20% (Muller, 1999). Evidence of short-
term price momentum was also noted for the winners, while 
long-term mean reversion was present in the loser portfolios, 
which is consistent with Jagadeesh and Titman's (1993) 
findings. Therefore, Muller suggested that holding 20 - 40 
equally weighted winner shares over a short period, or 
holding 20 - 30 losers for longer than a year would have 
generated excess returns over the market in the period 
examined. Muller only used the top 200 shares on the JSE in 
his study so the actual largest winners and losers were 
omitted. This survivorship bias may have affected his 
results. 
Cubbin et al. (2006) constructed portfolios of the top and 
bottom 35 shares - defined by their P/E ratios - following 
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De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) methodology. Included in the 
portfolios were all of the shares that had been delisted, as 
well as those listed, between 1983 and 2005 to compensate 
for the survivorship bias. Their results ratify Page and Way 
(1992) and Muller's (1999) results of loser portfolios 
outperforming winners in the long-term on the JSE. Their 
results show that the winner portfolios experienced upward 
momentum for roughly eight months; thereafter the loser 
portfolios began to outperform the winners. This differs 
from De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) results that showed the 
loser portfolios outperforming the winners immediately. 
Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) found evidence of mean reversion 
and loser portfolio outperformance that validates that of 
Page and Way (1992), Muller (1999), and Cubbin et al. 
(2006). Furthermore, Hsieh and Hodnett considered that 
when there was a financial downturn, a contrarian 
investment strategy might be a secure investment strategy. 
The aim of this article is to empirically test whether these 
premiums do in fact exist on the JSE in the 1999 - 2012 
period. This differs from previous work, as the time period 
being investigated is very recent. In addition, portfolios 
were constructed on the basis of four valuation multiples, as 
well as by market capitalisation - differing from prior 
research conducted on the JSE where only one price 
multiple was chosen and tested. The former portfolios were 
used to identify a value premium; the latter determined 
whether a size premium existed. The portfolios based on the 
four multiples were then sub-divided by market 
capitalisation to investigate whether the value and size 
premiums occurred independently of each other. In 
summation, this paper attempts to provide a broader set of 
results than have previously been obtained. It also serves to 
be one of the most current explorations into the presence of 
the value and size effects on the JSE. 
Data and methodology 
The closing share prices, P/B, PIE, P/CF, DY, and market 
capitalisations for the listed shares on the JSE main board 
were all obtained from Bloomberg (using the relevant 
Microsoft Excel formula) for each month-end for the period 
1992 - 2012. However, only the data for the 14-year period 
spanning 31 December 1998 - 31 December 2012 were 
utilised. The stock history relates to the 165 members 
comprising the JSE Africa All Share Index (JALSH) as of 
January 2013. The JALSH was selected because it contains 
the companies that make up the top 99% of the total market 
capitalisation of the JSE. 
The data received from Bloomberg were not modified for 
look-ahead bias; therefore, the multiples were all current and 
not lagged. Due to the data pertaining to the 14-year history 
of the current JALSH members, the initial years of data 
were not always complete, or had very few members. This is 
as a result of the current members not yet being included in 
the index, or even being listed at the time. 
S.Afr.J.Bus.Manage.2014,45(4) 
Using this share information, portfolios were constructed 
following the methodology of Bauman et al. (1998). 
However, each portfolio was created in January and held for 
12 months, as opposed to using differing portfolio 
construction dates due to varying firm financial year-ends. 
A Microsoft Excel model was used to assemble the 
portfolios, calculate the return information, and perform the 
necessary statistical tests. 
To investigate whether a value effect exists on the JSE, 
value-growth multiples were used to form quartiles. Each 
quartile was equivalent to one portfolio, which aided in 
identifying the type of stock in the portfolios. The first 
quartile of the P/B portfolios contained the stocks with the 
lowest P/B ratios, generally associated with value stocks. 
The second and third quartiles housed the stocks with the 
second lowest and second highest P/B ratios, respectively. 
The last quartile, with the highest P/B ratios, contained the 
growth stocks. The structure of the P/E and P/CF portfolios 
was identical to that of the P/B portfolios. In terms of DY, 
the first quartile included stocks with a high ratio, thus value 
shares; the fourth quartile held stocks with a low DY, hence 
classified as growth stocks. The portfolios were reformed in 
every year of the 14-year period. 
To test the evidence of a small firm premium, portfolios 
based on market capitalisation were constructed following 
the same principles as above. Shares with the smallest 
market capitalisations fell into the first quartile; conversely, 
the fourth quartile contained the shares with the largest 
market capitalisations. 
At the end of each year, the average return and standard 
deviation were calculated for each quartile. Using the 
returns, the spread between the first and fourth quartiles was 
computed. The significance of the spread was calculated 
using the two-tailed Student's t-test for equal or unequal 
variances. A two-tailed t-test was chosen so as to determine 
whether or not there was a significant difference in the 
spread, regardless of the direction of the difference. Only t-
test p-values that were less than 10% were considered as 
being significant. The equality of variances was determined 
by using the F-test for equal variances. If the F-test was 
significant at the 10% level, the variances were deemed 
unequal and the appropriate t-test was conducted. It is 
important to note that the calculation used for all standard 
deviations assumes that all share returns are perfectly 
correlated, i.e., that there is no diversification - this is a 
conservative approach. 
At the end of the 14-year period, the arithmetic and 
geometric mean returns, as well as the standard deviations, 
for the portfolios were computed. In addition to the portfolio 
returns, the mean return for the JALSH was included each 
year, as well as its arithmetic and geometric mean return for 
the entire period. This aided in assessing the performance of 
the portfolios over the entire period. In addition to these 
data, the total number of observations was reported. 
75 
Value-growth multiples were further sub-divided into 
groups based on market capitalisation - resulting in 16 sub-
groups per multiple. The purpose of this was to identify 
whether a value premium was stronger in small- or large-cap 
firms, as well as which multiple provided the strongest 
indication of this effect, if it existed. Due to a lack of 
complete stock information in the early years of the study 
(mentioned earlier), any null returns were assumed to be a 
0% return. 
The geometric annual mean returns were computed over the 
14-year period for each sub-group. The column- and row-
based average returns were computed, as well as the spread 
between the value and growth quartiles. The data were then 
observed to uncover any underlying trends over the 
complete period. 
This methodology expands on the work done by Graham 
and Uliana (2001), Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003), 
Auret and Cline (2011), and Strugnell et al. (2011). Each of 
these sets of authors only used one valuation multiple -
either P/E, P/B or book-to-market - in their research. The 
use of four commonly used ratios applied to 14 years of 
market data allows a broader set of comparative results to be 
formulated. 
Portfolio performance and discussion 
The results are presented in this section in three parts. The 
first and second parts are presented in the form of a one-
factor model to establish whether the value and size 
premiums occurred, respectively. The one-factor model 
calculated the annual returns for each of the individual 
multiples (P/B, PIE, P!CF, DY, and market capitalisation) in 
isolation. The third part utilises a two-factor model, where 
the valuation multiples were sub-divided by market 
capitalisation to identify if any interaction between the value 
and size premiums existed. 
The value premium 
Based on the background research conducted, the price to 
book, price to earnings, price to cash flow, and dividend 
yield appeared to be the most common valuation criteria for 
firms. The performance of the quartile portfolios was 
examined each year to gauge the consistency of the return 
differential between value and growth stocks. 
Table 1 displays the total number of stock returns observed 
each year, as well as the portfolio returns that are classified 
by P/B. The value portfolios outperformed growth in only 
four of the years; growth outperformed value in the other ten 
years. In two of the four years, value outperformed growth 
with statistical significance, whereas growth showed 
statistically significant outperformance in four of its ten 
years. Overall, the geometric mean return for the value 
portfolios (23,6%) fell short of the growth portfolios' 
(28,2%) by 450 bps. The growth portfolio also showed 
lower volatility than the value portfolio. The value portfolio 
was, in fact, the most volatile of the portfolios, followed by 
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Quartile 3. The growth portfolio also exhibited higher risk-
adjusted returns than the value portfolio -illustrated by the 
risk/return ratio (the arithmetic mean over standard 
deviation) in Table 1. The risk/return ratio measures the 
return generated by a portfolio per one unit of risk. Quartile 
2 actually exhibited the lowest return but displayed a risk-
adjusted return higher than Quartile 1, due to its low 
volatility. The return data for the four quartiles from Table 1 
are graphed in Figure 1. Quartiles 1 and 4 are shown in 
Figure 1 a, and Quartiles 2 and 3 are graphed in F iguare 1 b 
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(simply for comparison). From these figures it is evident 
that over the period, each quartile outperformed the index, 
although not in every year. The large drop in returns in 2008 
is attributable to the 2008 credit crisis. Using this as a focal 
point in Figure 1a, it is noticeable that prior to the crisis, 
value stocks (Quartile 1) mostly outperformed growth. But 
post-2008, growth stocks (Quartile 4) have been 
outperforming value, which is an interesting turnaround. 
Table 1: Portfolio returns and standard deviations by year for value and growth stocks based on P/B, 1999-2012. 
Time Period 
1/99 - 12/99 
Return 
Standard Deviation 
1/00 - 12/00 
Return 
Standard Deviation 






1/03 - 12/03 
Return 
Standard Deviation 
1/04 - 12/04 
Return 
Standard Deviation 
1/05 - 12/05 
Return 
Standard Deviation 
1/06 - 12/06 
Return 
Standard Deviation 
1/07 - 12/07 
Return 
Standard Deviation 
1/08 - 12/08 
Return 
Standard Deviation 
1/09 - 12/09 
Return 
Standard Deviation 
1/10 - 12/10 
Return 
Standard Deviation 
1/11 - 12/11 
Return 
Standard Deviation 
1/12 - 12/12 
Return 
Standard Deviation 
Portfolio Performance, 1/99 - 12/12 
Geometric Mean Return 
Arithmetic Mean Return 
Standard Deviation of Returns 
Risk/Return Ratio 
































































































































































































Figure 1: Portfolio and JALSH returns by year for value and growth stocks based on P/B, 1999-2012 for (a) quartiles 1 
and 4 and (b) quartiles 2 and 3 
The quartile portfolio returns of stocks based on P/E are 
illustrated in Table 2, and it shows a different result to Table 
1. In this instance, both the value and growth portfolios 
outperformed one another seven times each. For five of the 
seven years, the outperformance of the value portfolios was 
statistically significant. As opposed to this, none of the 
growth outperformances were significant. At the end of the 
14-year period, the geometric mean return of the value 
portfolios was 33,6% (the highest of all the quartiles), 920 
bps higher than the growth portfolios' return (24,4%). As 
well as having the highest return, the value portfolios 
exhibited the highest variability; Quartiles 2 and 3 had the 
lowest standard deviations. Both Quartiles 2 and 3 displayed 
the highest risk-adjusted returns, with the value and growth 
portfolios having the second lowest and lowest, respectively. 
As with Figure 1, Figure 2 shows the results from Table 2 in 
graphical form. Figure 2a, pertaining to the value (Quartile 
1) and growth (Quartile 4) stocks, shows evidence of a value 
premium in the years prior to the credit crisis. Unlike the 
trend in Figure 1 a, the value premium continues post-crisis, 
although it is somewhat diminished. Quartiles 2 and 3, seen 
in Figure 2b, show noticeably smaller and less erratic 
returns (between -1 5% and 55%) than Quartiles 1 and 2 
(between -35% and 122%). 
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Table 2: Portfolio returns and standard deviations by year for value and growth stocks based on PIE, 1999-2012 
Value-Growth Quartile 
Value Growth 
Total Spread between JALSH 
Time Period Observations 2 3 4 Quartiles 1 and 4 mean return 
1/99 - 12/99 104 
Return 84,5% 42,5% 37,3% 122,6% -38,1% 54,5% 
Standard Deviation 63,8% 40,1% 39,0% 45,6% 
1/00 - 12/00 418 
Return 1,4% 16,1% -14,8% 3,6% -2, 1% -1 ,4% 
Standard Deviation 37,0% 36,8% 40,4% 38,1% 
1/01 - 12/01 949 
Return 71 ,8% 30,8% 27,1% 24,4% 47,4% *** 16,9% 
Standard Deviation 49,4% 35,0% 33,8% 42,7% 
1/02 - 12/02 1 091 
Return 5,6% 34,7% 15,9% 9,9% -4,2% -10,2% 
Standard Deviation 37,8% 32,5% 26,9% 36,4% 
1/03- 12/03 1 140 
Return 60,7% 35,0% 35,8% 17,9% 42,8% ** 18,1% 
Standard Deviation 68 1% 33,0% 29 9% 34,9% 
1/04- 12/04 1 179 
Return 69,9% 47,5% 53,0% 18,3% 51,6% *** 16,7% 
Standard Deviation 35,1% 24,2% 25,5% 3 1,1% 
1/05- 12/05 1 251 
Return 103,9% 31 ,7% 40,2% 45,9% 58,0% *** 41,4% 
Standard Deviation 41,3% 22,8% 25,2% 29,0% 
1/06- 12/06 1 252 
Return 46,9% 32,4% 41 ,6% 48,7% -1,8% 26,2% 
Standard Deviation 33,2% 27,2% 27,0% 28,5% 
1/07 - 12/07 1 379 
Return 27,9% 10,4% 26,6% 37,5% -9,6% 13,8% 
Standard Deviation 28,6% 24,0% 27,5% 28,2% 
1/08 - 12/08 1 508 
Return -35,1% -28,0% -19,3% -25,7% -9,4% -21,3% 
Standard Deviation 4 8,1% 38 4% 42,5% 486% 
1/09 - 12/09 1 516 
Return 30,7% 24,7% 37,8% 30,2% 0,5% 34,5% 
Standard Deviation 42,3% 34,7% 25,3% 35,6% 
1/10 - 12/10 1 559 
Return 33 ,8% 28,9% 25,7% 2 1,5% 12,3% * 20,4% 
Standard Deviation 27,2% 25,8% 20,9% 25,5% 
1/11 - 12/11 1 663 
Return 8,1% -1 ,4% 0,9% 3,0% 5,1% 1,9% 
Standard Deviation 21,0% 17,6% 18,6% 21,6% 
1/12- 12/12 1 700 
Return 32,7% 25,7% 22,5% 33,7% -0,9% 16,2% 
Standard Deviation 25,9% 20,2% 21,1% 2 1,5% 
Portfolio Performance, 1/99 - 12/12 
Geometric Mean Return 33 ,6% 2 1,9% 21 ,6% 24,4% 9,2% 14,6% 
Arithmetic Mean Return 38,8% 23,6% 23 ,6% 27,9% 10,8% 16,3% 
Standard Deviation of Returns 37,3% 19,5% 21,3% 33,4% 20,0% 
Risk/Return Ratio 1,04 1,21 1,11 0,84 0,82 
* Significant at I 0% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at I % 
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Figure 2: Portfolio and JALSH returns by year for value and growth stocks based on PIE, 1999-2012 for (a) quartiles 1 
and 4 and (b) quartiles 2 and 3 
When the portfolio quartiles are fonned by P/CF, the results 
are comparable to those found by the P/E portfolios. Table 3 
shows that of the nine times that the value portfolios 
outperformed the growth portfolios, only three of those 
times were statistically significant. When growth 
outperformed value, only one of the results was significant, 
and the magnitude was not as large as the value 
outperformances. On the whole, the value portfolios 
exhibited a geometric mean return (30,9%) that was 470 bps 
higher than the growth portfolios' (26, 1 %). Again, the value 
portfolios illustrated the highest return, with Quartiles 2 and 
3 having the lowest returns. Echoing the results found in 
Table 2, both Quartiles 2 and 3 had much lower volatilities 
than the value and growth portfolios. As a result, their risk-
adjusted returns were, in fact, much higher than the other 
two portfolios'. Following the same process as the previous 
tables, Table 3 has been graphed in Figure 3 with the returns 
of Quartiles 1 and 4 depicted in Figure 3a, and Quartiles 2 
and 3 plotted in Figure 3b. Similar to Figure 2a, the value 
effect persisted pre-2008. Post-crisis, any value stock 
outperformance has been matched by growth stock 
outperformance, rendering the post-crisis value effect to 
null. Over the whole period, each portfolio outperformed the 
JALSH. 
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2 3 4 
Spread between JALSH 
Observations Quartiles 1 and 4 mean return 
1/99- 12/99 78 
Return 107,9% 32,3% 53,2% 129,4% -21,5% 54,5% 
Standard Deviation 54,9% 46,7% 44,5% 47,3% 
1/00- 12/00 346 
Return -4,2% 10,4% 2,0% 1,5% -5,6% -1,4% 
Standard Deviation 42,5% 34,9% 37,8% 41,9% 
1/01 - 12/01 767 
Return 93,4% 36,8% 25,9% 24,1% 69,3% *** 16,9% 
Standard Deviation 64,8% 35,6% 39,2% 38,0% 
1/02 - 12/02 1 000 
Return 23,6% 21,9% 13,6% 18,0% 5,6% -10,2% 
Standard Deviation 47,1% 33,3% 26,1% 34,3% 
1/03 - 12/03 1 124 
Return 42,3% 21,7% 40,7% 39,2% 3,2% 18,1% 
Standard Deviation 54,2% 33,9% 29,5% 51,9% 
1/04 - 12/04 1 124 
Return 54,2% 48,1% 48,4% 38,7% 15,6% * 16,7% 
Standard Deviation 37,0% 26,5% 26,7% 25,7% 
1/05- 12/05 1 212 
Return 81,0% 63,5% 31,5% 40,4% 40,6% *** 41,4% 
Standard Deviation 36,5% 30,8% 23 8% 27,0% 
1/06- 12/06 1 302 
Return 46,9% 36,8% 4 8,7% 36,8% 10,1 % 26,2% 
Standard Deviation 29,6% 24,5% 29,6% 31,7% 
1/07 - 12/07 1 33 1 
Return 27,5% 22,8% 26,8% 26,0% 1,5% 13,8% 
Standard Deviation 25,9% 26,0% 26,0% 29,3% 
1/08 - 12/08 1 409 
Return -39,1% -22,7% -1 7,9% -28,0% -11 ,1% -21,3% 
Standard Deviation 46,5% 42,5% 43,1% 46,9% 
1/09 - 12/09 1 505 
Return 28,3% 30,8% 23,5% 34,1 % -5,9% 34,5% 
Standard Deviation 43,7% 39,0% 29,9% 30,7% 
1/10 - 12/10 1 553 
Return 30,0% 23,7% 31,1% 24,1 % 5,8% 20,4% 
Standard Deviation 28,8% 21,6% 21,9% 25,8% 
1/11 - 12/11 1 510 
Return 5,0% 1,2% 6,7% -1,3% 6,3% 1,9% 
Standard Deviation 2 1,9% 18,3% 18,3% 21,5% 
1/12 - 12/12 1 571 
Return 14,3% 26,9% 26,1% 37,0% -22,7% *** 16,2% 
Standard Deviation 25,4% 22,8% 20,4% 21,2% 
Portfolio Performance, 1/99 - 12/12 
Geometric Mean Return 30,9% 23,6% 24,2% 26,1% 4,7% 14,6% 
Arithmetic Mean Return 36,5% 25,3% 25,7% 30,0% 6,5% 16,3% 
Standard Deviation of Returns 39,2% 20,5% 19,8% 34,7% 20,0% 
Risk/Return Ratio 0,93 1,23 1,30 0,86 0,82 
* Significant at I 0% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at I % 
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Figure 3: Portfolio and JALSH returns by year for value and growth stocks based on P/CF, 1999-2012 for (a) quartiles 
1 and 4 and (b) quartiles 2 and 3 
The data obtained from the portfolios formed by DY, see 
Table 4, showed that growth portfolios regularly 
outperformed value portfolios. These data have also been 
displayed graphically in Figure 4. Of the 14 years, the 
growth portfolios outperformed value in 12 of the years, 
often in excess of 10%. Yet, of these 12 years, only four of 
the years displayed statistically significant results. By 
deduction, the value portfolio outperformed growth twice, 
and neither outperformance was significant. Over the whole 
period, the growth portfolios (27,4%), followed by Quartiles 
3 (24,6%) and 2 (22,4%) generated the highest geometric 
mean returns. The value portfolios lagged behind the growth 
portfolios by approximately 960 bps over the period. 
However, the value portfolios had the lowest volatility, and 
the growth portfolios had the highest variability in returns. 
Taking risk into account, the growth portfolios still 
maintained the highest risk-adjusted returns. The risk-
adjusted returns diminish as the portfolios become more 
value-based and less growth-based, as noted by Quartiles 3, 
2, and 1. The performance of the value and growth stocks, 
shown in Figure 4a, illustrates the consistent growth effect 
that persisted both pre- and post-crisis. As with the other 
value multiples, each portfolio outperformed the JALSH 
overall. 
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Table 4: Portfolio Returns and standard deviations by year for value and growth stocks based on DY, 1999-2012 
Value-Growth Quartile 
Growth Value 
Total Spread between JALSH 
Time Period Observations 2 3 4 Quartiles 1 and 4 mean return 
1/99 - 12/99 973 
Return 72,9% 76,5% 48,1% 57,7% 15,3% 54,5% 
Standard Deviation 50,7% 46,5% 49,5% 48,7% 
1/00 - 12/00 1 022 
Return -10,4% 7,6% -1,3% 4,4% -14,8% -1,4% 
Standard Deviation 43,7% 33,6% 41,6% 33,5% 
1/01 - 12/01 1 023 
Return 19,0% 23,8% 63,6% 6,0% 13,0% 16,9% 
Standard Deviation 38,3% 31 ,9% 38,1 % 38,1 % 
1/02 - 12/02 1 068 
Return 28,6% 4,2% 21,6% 12,1% 16,5% * -10,2% 
Standard Deviation 35,7% 31 8% 32,7% 28,4% 
1/03 - 12/03 1 135 
Return 35,3% 35,1% 26,5% 23,7% 11,6% 18,1% 
Standard Deviation 32,1% 29,5% 35,5% 31,0% 
1/04- 12/04 1 180 
Return 48,5% 45,1% 53,3% 34,7% 13,8% * 16,7% 
Standard Deviation 31,2% 25,5% 24,3% 25,3% 
1/05 - 12/05 1 284 
Return 59,5% 48,3% 42,3% 42,5% 17,0% ** 41 ,4% 
Standard Deviation 32,3% 25,8% 27,0% 25,9% 
1/06 - 12/06 1 313 
Return 53,5% 36,0% 33,3% 33,5% 20,0% ** 26,2% 
Standard Deviation 28,1% 24,5% 25,8% 30,6% 
1/07 - 12/07 1 364 
Return 43,6% 24,5% 4,8% 12,8% 30,8% *** 13,8% 
Standard Deviation 27,8% 24,7% 25,2% 22,8% 
1/08 - 12/08 1 445 
Return -25,2% -28,4% -23,3% -25,6% 0,3% -21,3% 
Standard Deviation 4 8 7% 43,8% 38,8% 39,8% 
1/09 - 12/09 1 478 
Return 38,4% 33,5% 26,5% 25,8% 12,6% 34,5% 
Standard Deviation 36,0% 30,7% 40,1% 32,9% 
1/10 - 12/10 1 5 12 
Return 25,7% 32,7% 23 ,0% 22,2% 3,5% 20,4% 
Standard Deviation 26,4% 24,2% 23,4% 19,0% 
1/11 - 12/11 1 678 
Return 2,2% 6,8% -1 ,0% 4,2% -2,0% 1,9% 
Standard Deviation 22,7% 20,6% 19,4% 17,6% 
1/12 - 12/12 1 734 
Return 33,2% 33,4% 27,5% 19,0% 14,2% *** 16,2% 
Standard Deviation 25,5% 22,5% 19,5% 19,8% 
Portfolio Performance, 1/99 - 12/12 
Geometric Mean Return 27,4% 24,6% 22,4% 17,8% 9,6% 14,6% 
Arithmetic Mean Return 30,4% 27,1% 24,6% 19,5% 10,8% 16,3% 
Standard Deviation of Returns 27,0% 24,6% 23,7% 20,1% 20,0% 
Risk/Return Ratio 1,1 2 1,10 1,04 0,97 0,82 
* Significant at I 0% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at I % 
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Figure 4: Portfolio and JALSH returns by year for value and growth stocks based on DY, 1999-2012 for (a) quartiles 1 
and 4 and (b) quartiles 2 and 3 
In summary, the overall results showed that each portfolio 
outperformed the index. In addition to the outperformance, 
each portfolio's risk-adjusted return was higher than the 
index's. However, the results do not show conclusive 
evidence of a value effect existing across all of the 
multiples, illustrating partial agreement with the 
international study conducted by Bauman et al. (1998). 
More specifically, it can be noted that a strong value effect 
exists on the JSE when assessing portfolios based on the P/E 
and P/CF ratios, which is consistent with the South African 
findings by Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003), Strugnell 
et al. (20 11 ), and Hodnett et al. (20 12). These results 
reaffirm the initial research conducted in the United States 
by Basu (1977), and later verified by Fama and French 
(1992), that showed that low P/E (value) stocks outperform 
high P/E (growth) stocks. Furthermore, Lakonishok et al. 
(1994) also identified a value premium for low P/CF and 
low P/E businesses - echoed by the results identified above. 
Bauman et al. (1998) also observed the strong similarities 
between the PIE and P/CF portfolios. However, the results 
of the current study show that the value portfolios did not 
yield the highest risk-adjusted returns, instead Quartiles 2 
and 3 had the highest risk/return ratios. 
The P/B- and DY-based portfolios did not show evidence of 
a value effect; instead the growth portfolios were the top 
performers. This contradicts some of the findings outlined 
by Hodnett et al. (2012), namely that a value effect existed 
for portfolios based on DY and P/B. Bauman et al. (1998) 
also identified a value premium when portfolios were based 
on P/B and DY, which are also in opposition to the current 
study's results. Graham and Uliana (2001) found that value 
and growth stocks, defined by P/B, outperformed each other 
equally in their 10-year study on the JSE. Thus, showing 
neither a value nor growth effect enduring. The current 
paper opposes the fmdings of Dimson et al. (2003) that 
documented a value premium prevailing for DY -based 
portfolios. 
An examination of value and growth portfolio performance 
before and after the 2008 credit crisis reveals two interesting 
results. Firstly, the value effect that prevailed pre-2008 for 
stocks based on P/B turned into a growth effect after the 
crisis, seen in Figure 1a. Secondly, Figure 3a shows the 
opposite result occurring for stocks based on P/CF - the 
value premium that existed pre-crisis has dissipated since 
2008. Overall, the spreads between value and growth prior 
to 2008 have narrowed since the financial crisis. 
Further observation showed that when the growth portfolios 
were the top performers, they also yielded the highest risk-
adjusted returns and the value portfolios yielded the lowest. 
It appears that the strongest value effect (9,2%) persisted in 
the PIE-based portfolios; the DY-based portfolios 
experienced the strongest growth effect (9,6%). 
The size premium 
To ascertain whether a size premium exists on the JSE, 
portfolio groups were constructed on the basis of market 
capitalisation, as opposed to value multiples. Table 5 shows 
the portfolio returns and standard deviations of the small-
and large-cap portfolios. As a visual comparison, Figure 5 
shows the return information for each of the size groups in 
Table 5. Of the 14 years examined, the portfolio with the 
smallest firms (Group A) outperformed the portfolio with 
the largest firms (Group D) for eight years; the opposite 
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occurred for six years. The small-caps significantly 
outperformed the large-caps for six of the eight years; the 
large-caps had one significant result in their six years of 
outperformance. The outperformance of the small-cap 
pmtfolio translates into a geometric mean return (30,4%) 
that is 1003 bps higher than the large-cap portfolio's 
(20,2%). Group C (second largest firms) generated superior 
returns to the large-cap stocks as well. 
The high retum coupled with the small-cap stocks may be 
associated with a risk premium, suggested by the highest 
standard deviation being attributed to them. Bauman et al. 
(1998) found that small-caps exhibited the highest 
volatilities and that there was an inverse relationship 
between market cap and return volatility. Eun et al. (2008) 
found that mid-caps showed the lowest standard deviations 
overall, followed by large- and small-caps respectively. In 
this study, the second smallest (Group B) and second largest 
(Group C) firms both had the lowest standard deviations -
the two groups together are considered the mid-cap firms -
thereby validating Eun, Huang and Lai's (2008) results, as 
well as parts of Bauman, Conover and Miller 's (1 998). 
Overall, Group C exhibited superior risk-adjusted returns -
due to its fairly low volatility (22,3%) coupled with a 
relatively high average return (25,7%) - followed by Groups 
A, B, and D accordingly. 
The graphed returns of the smallest- and largest-cap sizes 
(see Figure 5a) show that small-caps have continuously 
outperformed large-caps. The credit crisis seems to have 
affected the small-caps the most, as their returns fell to -
33,7%, more than 10% lower than Groups C and D. Yet, 
after the crisis small stocks continued to generate excess 
returns over both larger stocks and the market. But, the 
small-cap premium looks to have diminished slightly post-
crisis. Figure 5b shows that the spread between the second 
smallest and second largest stocks is approximately 5% over 
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the period, with the second largest stocks consistently 
outperforming the smaller stocks. 
Again it can be observed that each portfolio, defined by size, 
performed better than the JALSH, as well as generating 
higher risk-adjusted returns. The results show evidence of a 
small firm size premium existing on the JSE. Despite the 
returns not diminishing consistently when increasing the 
firm size - Group B has smaller geometric returns (18,2%) 
than Group C (23,7%) - Groups A and C both outperformed 
the largest-cap portfolio, Group D. On a risk-adjusted basis, 
Groups A, B, and Call outperformed Group D. Therefore, 
the regular and significant outperformance by small-cap 
firms is indicative of a small frrm effect persisting on the 
JSE. However, it is still questionable how much of the 
premium is associated with risk. 
These results corroborate the existence of a size premium 
existing on the JSE, as documented by Van Rensburg and 
Robertson (2003) and Strugnell et al. (2011). Although, it 
contradicts what Auret and Cline (2011) concluded about 
the JSE - that no size effect persists. The excess returns for 
small firms are also identified in international markets 
(Keirn, 1983; Bauman et al. , 1998; Eun et al., 2008). 
Although betas are not used in this study, Van Rensburg and 
Robertson (2003) and Strugnell et al. (2011) found that 
small-cap stocks had low betas. This indicated that there 
was surprisingly less risk associated with small-caps, despite 
their positive excess returns. Yet, in this study only standard 
deviations were utilised, which indicated higher risk 
associated with small-cap stocks as compared to large-caps, 
also discovered by Bauman et al. (1998) and Eun et al. 
(2008). Despite the higher r isk, small-caps earned higher 
risk-adjusted returns than large-caps. The higher risk 
associated with small-caps, as well as the high risk-adjusted 
returns, appears to be in agreement with Bauman et als ' 
(1998) international study, as well as Banz's (1980) 
research. 
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Table 5: Portfolio returns and standard deviations by year based on firm size, 1999-2012 
Firm Size GrouE 
Small Large 
Total Spread between JALSH 
Time Period Observations A B c D Grou:es A and D mean return 
1/99 - 12/99 867 
Return 26,4% 28,5% 66,7% 76,5% -50,1% *** 54,5% 
Standard Deviation 52,4% 56,1% 49,1% 45,8% 
1/00 - 12/00 1 197 
Return -3,4% -0,2% -6,3% 3,0% -6,4% -1 ,4% 
Standard Deviation 48,0% 43 ,1% 38,5% 36,9% 
1/01 - 12/01 1 311 
Return 37,1% 35,2% 38,2% 29,0% 8,0% 16,9% 
Standard Deviation 60,9% 37,4% 41 ,3% 37,3% 
1/02 - 12/02 1 351 
Return 42,9% 8,4% 18,0% 0,8% 42,1% *** -10,2% 
Standard Deviation 44,7% 31 ,7% 33 3% 370% 
1/03 - 12/03 1 394 
Return 50,3% 26,3% 31,4% 14,0% 36,3% ** 18,1% 
Standard Deviation 73 2% 32 9% 28,2% 34,1% 
1/04- 12/04 1 425 
Return 62,5% 37,1% 44,3% 30,9% 31,6% *** 16,7% 
Standard Deviation 39,1 % 27,6% 23,7% 25,5% 
1/05 - 12/05 1 471 
Return 97,1% 38,2% 34,5% 47,6% 49,5% *** 41,4% 
Standard Deviation 40,3% 29,7% 24,3% 28,3% 
1/06 - 12/06 1 492 
Return 43,5% 34,4% 44,0% 44,0% -0,5% 26,2% 
Standard Deviation 32,9% 28,5% 28,2% 27,6% 
1/07 - 12/07 1 571 
Return 44,4% 31,7% 24,0% 9,0% 35,5% *** 13,8% 
Standard Deviation 34,4% 27,4% 26,0% 25,2% 
1/08 - 12/08 1 655 
Return -33,7% -27,7% -22,1% -23,5% -1 0,2% -21,3% 
Standard Deviation 44,5% 46,9% 42,8% 45,3% 
1/09 - 12/09 1 700 
Return 28,5% 29,3% 29,4% 32,6% -4,0% 34,5% 
Standard Deviation 42,2% 32,3% 32,5% 36,0% 
1/10 - 12/10 1 728 
Return 40,3% 22,0% 27,8% 16,0% 24,3% *** 20,4% 
Standard Deviation 28,8% 23,7% 22,2% 24,3% 
1/11 - 12/11 1 812 
Return 10,7% -6, 1% 4,9% 3,5% 7,2% 1,9% 
Standard Deviation 21 ,3% 20,6% 18,5% 20,7% 
1/12 - 12/12 1 890 
Return 30,8% 21,6% 25,5% 31,9% -1 ,0% 16,2% 
Standard Deviation 26,3% 21,1% 22,5% 20,1% 
Portfolio Performance, 1/99 - 12/12 
Geometric Mean Return 30,4% 18,2% 23,7% 20,2% 10,3% 14,6% 
Arithmetic Mean Return 34,1% 19,9% 25,7% 22,5% 11,6% 16,3% 
Standard Deviation of Returns 30,4% 19,4% 22,3% 24,7% 20,0% 
Risk/Return Ratio 1,12 1,03 1,16 0,91 0,82 
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Figure 5: Portfolio and JALSH returns by year based on firm size, 1999-2012 for (a) groups A and D and (b) groups B 
andC 
Value and size premium interaction 
It is evident that a value, growth, and small firm premium 
existed on the JSE in the period examined. Although, 
evidence of the value and growth premiums depended on the 
valuation multiple used in the portfolios. The value quartiles 
were further sub-divided into four groups based on market 
cap - creating 16 sub-groups in total - to determine whether 
the value premium can be associated with firm size. For 
each multiple, the returns from the 16 sub-groups over the 
14-year period were computed, and their corresponding 
geometric mean returns are presented in Table 6. It should 
be noted that Bauman et al. (1998) simply examined the 
average annual returns (arithmetic mean retums) of the 16 
sub-groups. It was decided that a geometric mean return 
would be a more accurate and conservative representation of 
the results, as it assumes that the annual returns are not 
independent of each other. Also included are column- and 
row-based average returns, which demonstrate the value 
effect and size effect respectively. Each of the returns in 
Table 6 was graphed in Figure 6 and Figure 7. The former 
depicts the geometric returns in terms of the value effect, 
grouped by size quartile; the latter illustrates the returns in 
terms of the size premium, grouped by valuation quartile. 
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Multiple and Size 
2 
Firm Size Group 
PIE Criterion 
Small A 27,2% 25,0% 
B 20,2% 20,0% 
c 21,9% 21,0% 
Large D 17,9% 10,6% 
Average Return 21,8% 19,1% 
PIE Criterion 
Small A 38,6% 23,3% 
B 21,9% 13,0% 
c 25,2% 15,0% 
Large D 15,3% 21,5% 
Average Return 25,2% 18,2% 
PICF Criterion 
Small A 33,5% 24,0% 
B 13,9% 18,8% 
c 28,5% 18,1% 
Large D 18,8% 20,8% 
Average Return 23,7% 20,4% 
DY Criterion 
Small A 20,6% 32,0% 
B 12,5% 18,5% 
c 14,9% 23,3% 
Large D 23,3% 13,7% 
Average Return 17,8% 21,8% 
The columnar average returns show a value premium 
existing for the PIE and P/CF criteria: as the multiple 
increases, the returns consequently decrease - this is 
illustrated by the downward trending bars in Figure 6b and 
Figure 6c. The highest average value stock return was 
25,2% for those in the P/E criterion. However, a growth 
premium persists when the P/B and DY criteria are 
examined: as the multiple shifts from value to growth, so the 
returns increase - visible by the upward trend in Figure 6a 
and Figure 6d. The highest average growth premium was 
28,4%, belonging to the P/B criterion. 
Examining the row-based average returns, it is evident that a 
size premium exists for all of the multiples across the JSE: 
as the firm size increases from small to large, the 
corresponding returns decrease by up to 10% - the 
downward trend in average mean returns clarifies this 
anomaly, apparent by the downward trending bars in all 
Figure 7 graphs. This corroborates the earlier findings of a 
size premium. The largest return was achieved by investing 
in the smallest-cap stocks grouped by P/B, earning 29,3% on 
average, followed by P/CF (28,9%), DY (26,3%), and PIE 
(26,2%). These column- and row-based observations are 




Average Spread between 
Return Quartiles 1 and 4 
36,6% 28,6% 29,3% -1,3% 
17,3% 31,6% 22,3% -11,4% 
22,5% 24,8% 22,5% -2,9% 
18,2% 28,7% 18,9% -10,8% 
23,6% 28,4% 
20,4% 22,4% 26,2% 16,2% 
17,5% 15,5% 17,0% 6,4% 
21,8% 15,9% 19,5% 9,3% 
15,0% 25,9% 19,4% -10,7% 
18,7% 19,9% 
26,6% 31,4% 28,9% 2,2% 
18,0% 15,2% 16,5% -1,2% 
20,5% 18,0% 21,3% 10,4% 
19,7% 22,2% 20,4% -3,4% 
21,2% 21,7% 
25,3% 27,2% 26,3% -6,5% 
22,0% 21,4% 18,6% -8,9% 
20,7% 28,7% 21 ,9% -13,8% 
21 ,6% 20,2% 19,7% 3,1% 
22,4% 24,4% 
On the whole, the results from the two-factor model make it 
difficult to determine whether any additional trends persist. 
Therefore, it is worth examining each sub-table individually, 
beginning with P/B. A growth premium was identified, 
however, most of this premium arose due to the second 
smallest (Group B) and largest firm sizes (Group D) that 
show growth outperforming value by 1140 and 1 080 bps 
respectively, depicted in Figure 6a. The smallest and second 
largest firms seem to have a weak growth effect, as both 
show excess returns ofless than 3% for the growth stock. 
The value premium identified by PIE persists largely within 
the smallest size group (Group A), where value 
outperformed growth by 1620 bps (see Figure 6b). Groups B 
and C follow suit with value outperforming growth by 640 
and 930 bps each. Interestingly, the largest firms exhibit a 
growth effect where growth outperformed value by 1070 
bps. 
Overall, the P/CF sub-table (illustrated in Figure 6c) 
displays a relatively small value premium of approximately 
2%, shown by the downward trending bars. Groups A, B, 
and D all display very little difference between value and 
growth performance. The second largest firms show the 
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Figure 6: Portfolio returns based on valuation multiples to illustrate the value effect across all firm sizes, 1999-2012 for 
a) P/B, b) PIE, c) P/CF and d) DY 
The final sub-table, graphed in Figure 6d, shows that Groups 
A, B, and C demonstrate moderate to strong growth 
outperformance of 650, 890, and 1380 bps respectively. The 
only group to exhibit a value premium (3,1%) was Group D 
consisting of the largest firms. 
At a macro level, large firms and the second smallest firms 
exhibited growth premiums averaging 540 and 380 bps over 
the period, respectively. A relatively small value premium -
averaging 260 bps for the smallest firms and 80 bps for the 
second largest firms - was earned over the period. However, 
of the four sub-tables, the largest value premium (16,2%) 
was exhibited by the smallest firms when grouped by P/E. 
Contrary to this, the smallest value premium - or the largest 
growth premium - was earned by the second largest firms 
grouped by DY (1 3,8%), as well as by the second smallest 
firms grouped byP/B (11 ,4%). 
The results, at a micro level, show returns that are in favour 
of investing in small-cap value firms. In both the PIE and 
P/CF tables, the sub-groups with the smallest firms within 
the first value quartile generated the highest geometric mean 
returns (38,6% and 33,5%, accordingly). Within the DY 
table, the highest geometric mean return (32%) belongs to 
the smallest firms in the second value quartile. The P/B table 
is the only table that indicates that one should rather invest 
in small-cap growth stock, with the highest geometric return 
(36,6%) belonging to the third value quartile. Therefore, 
small-cap value stocks tend to outperform small-cap growth 
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Figure 7: Portfolio returns based on firm size to illustrate the size effect across all valuation quartiles, 1999-2012 for a) 
P/B, b) PIE, c) P/CF and d) DY 
The problem with the abovementioned results is that no 
statistical tests were conducted on them; the analysis is 
mostly comparative and observational. Moreover, standard 
deviations and risk-adjusted returns could have provided 
further information about the data in Table 6. 
Comparing the two-factor portfolios with previous research 
on the JSE yields some supporting results. Van Rensburg 
and Robertson (2003), later affirmed by Strugnell et al. 
(2011), examined how PIE and firm size interacted and 
found the value and size effects to be independent of each 
other. Furthermore, this result was also confirmed 
internationally by Bauman et al. (1998). Bauman et al. 
(1998) and Dhatt et al. (1999) found that small-cap value 
stocks outperformed small-cap growth stocks, which also 
occurred, on average, in this study. Expanding this result to 
all of the multiples, it appears that holding a small stock will 
generate excess returns regardless of the ratio, suggesting 
that size is independent of the valuation multiple. However, 
as in the case of PIE, P/CF, and DY, the value premium 
complements the size premium somewhat. 
Conclusions and future work 
Portfolios were constructed using the 165 shares listed on 
the JSE Africa All Share Index based on four valuation 
criteria, as well as market capitalisation. These portfolios 
were used to detect a value effect and a small firm effect, 
respectively. The portfolios used for detecting the value 
premium generated mixed results. In the 14-year period 
from 1999 to 2012, value stocks outperformed growth 
stocks when the portfolios were based on P/E and P/CF, 
despite being coupled with the highest volatility and 
moderate risk-adjusted returns. When the portfolios were 
based on P/B and DY, growth stocks outperformed value 
stocks and showed moderate volatility, as well as high risk-
adjusted returns. It was also noted that over the 14-year 
period, each portfolio outperformed the index. 
With regards to the portfolios created based on market 
capitalisation, it was clear that a noteworthy size effect 
existed on the JSE. Small-caps did not outperform large-
caps every year, but when they did, they outperformed by a 
large and significant margin. Of the size groups, the small-
caps displayed the highest geometric mean returns, high 
risk-adjusted returns, as well as the highest variability in 
returns over the whole period. 
The value, growth and size premiums became more 
prominent in the two-factor models (where the valuation 
multiples were further sub-divided by firm size). Regardless 
of valuation multiple, the size premium was evident. In 
addition, the extent of the size premium was larger than 
either the growth or value premiums. It was also observed 
that both the size and value premiums acted independently 
of each other. However, small-cap value firms appeared to 
be the overall top performers, generating returns in excess of 
32% in the period examined. Large-cap growth stocks 
outperformed large-cap value stocks by an average of 5,4% 
over the period. The mid-cap stocks showed that there was 
very little difference between the growth and value stock 
performance. 
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As an investor, one cannot simply rely on superficial 
indicators, like valuation multiples or market capitalisation, 
as a basis for investment decisions. Regardless of which 
multiple was examined, neither value, growth, small-cap, 
nor large-cap always outperformed its respective other in 
every year. It is imperative for investors to conduct 
significant research into the stocks they plan to buy. 
While some of the results presented here verify those found 
internationally, as well as domestically, other parts show 
trends that were not identified in those same studies. The 
research conducted goes so far as to identify whether value 
and size premiums exist on the JSE. It does not try to offer 
an explanation as to why the observed value, growth and 
size premiums occur. 
Additional research could be conducted to explain whether 
the premiums identified in this study are independent, or are 
associated with market inefficiencies in a developing 
market; riskiness of stocks; illiquidity of small-cap stocks; 
investor overreactions; transaction costs; or for other reasons 
that have been overlooked. 
Mean reverting qualities of small- and large-cap stocks, as 
well as value and growth stocks could also be tested. Winner 
and loser portfolios could be created that comprise best and 
worst performing stocks per year - for each stock type - and 
holding them for variable time periods. This would 
determine which stock types revert to their means; the time 
taken for mean reversion to occur, if at all; and whether the 
magnitude of the reversion varies based on stock type. Part 
of the empirical research would be to investigate the 
behaviour of market participants and how they react to 
different market conditions, such as the 2008 credit crisis. 
These findings could then be used to further explain investor 
behaviour, along with the effects that the credit crisis, and 
other booms and busts, may have had on stock returns and 
trends on the JSE. 
Explaining why the various premiums exist on the JSE, why 
different price multiples benefit growth rather than value 
firms, whether mean reversion exists on the JSE, and the 
impact of the 2008 financial crisis provides sufficient 
grounds for future work to be conducted. 
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